This started as a clarification to some of what I wrote in the previous post...I was against the disengagement for a variety of reasons. However, I did see the possible good that could come out of it - namely, the reasons DovBear mentioned, plus the ability to attack strategically in Gaza without having to be concerned with hitting Israelis who live there (among other reasons). I agree to an extent with what Harry Maryles said today - I don't see the "I told you so!" about disengagement in terms of what Israel is doing.
I do, however, see that those who cried out against disengagement were right in other ways: As much as the international response has been a little less anti-Israel than it was in the past, the main statements we're hearing from all over are "restraint, restraint, restraint." This, even when soldiers have been kidnapped, which is generally viewed with more sympathy by the world. The claim that Israel would be able to take advantage of the fact that they had completely withdrawn from Gaza (and the Golan) simply isn't true.
Furthermore, Israel should have been responding like this all along. As soon as the first rockets from Gaza hit, Israel should have responded with full force. Most people don't seem to remember this, but in the first days after disengagement, Israel actually did respond - and had international backing. However, after a couple of weeks, Israel stopped responding... and when they decided to again, that international backing was gone.
The key here is that disengagement really could have worked: If the follow-ups we are seeing today would have been carried out at the first signs of attack every time they happened throughout the year. Had Israel done so, disengagement would have been fresh in people's minds, and the Palestinian hypocrisy impossible to deny. Instead, Israel waited (perhaps Sharon's stroke caused it, perhaps elections - Israeli or Palestinian, perhaps something else), and they lost that ability to respond and be backed by the world.
Whether or not you agreed with disengagement, it was a failure. Reasonable minds can argue as to whether or not it was a failure as a vision; but there is no doubt that it was a failure in its (lack of) execution.
I love how people can be so quick to judge a scenario in which they have very little frame of reference. On the disengagement issue, I dont think anyone can argue whether it was right or wrong unless they were briefed by military personnel and went through an extensive scenario analysis, which I'm sure Sharon did.
ReplyDeleteI've just been sick of hearing from everyone, "Sharon's an idiot! Whats he doing? He's out of his mind!"
Is it possible he is privy to more intel than we are? Probably.
Does it make sense that the most decorated hero in the history of the State will give land to the Arabs just for the hell of it? Probably not.
The point is, we are not in position to judge his actions at the moment. He might have made a horrible mistake, but then again, we won't know for sure until we look back many years from now.
I know this post would have been more appropriate last summer during the disengagement, but I joined the blogging scene pretty late. Peace.
It's okay, I wrote a piece exactly like that a while ago. I actually linked to it in this piece.
ReplyDeleteYour view seems to be the same as Yossi Klein Halevi's, it might have worked if it had been implemented correctly (i.e. if Israel retaliated quickly and effectively to every Palestinian infraction).
ReplyDeleteI disagree. PM Sharon didn't help himelf by showing both Yaalon and Dicter the door when they publicly disagreed with Sharon. I don't think that Yaalon would have objected if he felt it had been planned out properly in advance.
But "freedom to act" is a lousy reason for disengagement. Rockets were less likely to fly, materiel less likely to be smuggled if the IDF is in Gaza. Just like Hezbollah was able to expand its operations after Israel withdrew from Lebanon, so to Hamas did when it no longer had to play defense on its home turf. (Best defense is good offense.)
Finally my biggest objection to disengagement was the way the government made the resident of Gaza and their supporters the bad guys. It's one thing to say we must do it, but to divide the country in order to accomplish the task was despicable. (Look even now there are questions whether R' Yochanan ben Zakkai could have saved Yerushalayim. Ceding land doesn't necessarily make one wrong; doing it in a divisive manner does.)